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Abstract
Machine learning algorithms for prediction are
increasingly being used in critical decisions af-
fecting human lives. Various fairness formaliza-
tions, with no firm consensus yet, are employed
to prevent such algorithms from systematically
discriminating against people based on certain at-
tributes protected by law. The aim of this article
is to survey how fairness is formalized in the ma-
chine learning literature for the task of prediction
and present these formalizations with their cor-
responding notions of distributive justice from
the social sciences literature. We provide theo-
retical as well as empirical critiques of these no-
tions from the social sciences literature and ex-
plain how these critiques limit the suitability of
the corresponding fairness formalizations to cer-
tain domains. We also suggest two notions of
distributive justice which address some of these
critiques and discuss avenues for prospective fair-
ness formalizations.
1. Introduction
Discrimination refers to unfavourable treatment of people
due to the membership to certain demographic groups that
are distinguished by the attributes protected by law (hence-
forth, protected attributes). Discrimination, based on many
attributes and in several domains, is prohibited by interna-
tional legislation. Nowadays, machine learning algorithms
are increasingly being used in high-impact domains such as
credit, employment, education, and criminal justice which
are prone to discrimination. The goal of fairness in pre-
diction with machine learning is to design algorithms that
make fair predictions devoid of discrimination.
The aim of this article is to survey how fairness is for-
malized in the machine learning literature and present
these formalizations with their corresponding notions
from the social sciences literature. The fairness formal-
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izations in the machine learning literature correspond to the
notions of distributive justice from the social sciences liter-
ature, as we discuss in Section 2. Since, some formaliza-
tions of fairness can be conflicting with others, the predic-
tions produced by the algorithms using them would vastly
differ as well. Therefore, from the practical point of view,
it is important to study how fairness is formalized in the ma-
chine learning literature and the implications of various for-
malizations. To this end,we present theoretical as well as
empirical critiques of their corresponding notions from
the social sciences literature. The co-presentation is with
the intention to assist in determining the suitability of the
existing formalizations of fairness in machine learning
literature and building newer formalizations of fairness.
In Section 3, we nominate two notions from the social
sciences literature which answer some of the critiques of
the existing formalizations in the machine learning litera-
ture. Lastly, in Section 4, we discuss avenues for prospec-
tive fairness formalizations. We begin by formulating the
problem of prediction with machine learning.
Mathematical formulation of prediction with machine
learning: LetX , A and Z represent a set of individuals i.e.
a population, protected attributes and remaining attributes
respectively. Each of the individuals can be assigned an out-
come from a finite set Y . Some of the prediction outcomes
are considered to be more beneficial or desirable than oth-
ers. For an individualxi ∈ X , let yi be the true outcome (or
label) to be predicted. A (possibly randomized) predictor
can be represented by a mapping H : X → Y from popu-
lation X to the set of outcomes Y , such that H(xi) is the
predicted outcome for individual xi. A group-conditional
predictor consists of a set of mappings, one for each group
of the population,H = {HS} for all S ⊂ X. For the sake
of simplicity, assume that the groups induce a partition of
the population.
2. What is fair? (Formalizations of fairness in
prediction with machine learning)
The first step in formalizing fairness in prediction with ma-
chine learning is to answer the following two questions:
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Table 1. The surveyed formalizations of fairness
Parity Preference
Treatment Unawareness Preferred treatment
Counterfactual measures
Group fairness
Impact Individual fairness Preferred impact
Equality of opportunity
• Parity or preference? : whether fairness means
achieving parity or satisfying the preferences.
• Treatment or impact? : whether fairness is to be
maintained in treatment or impact (results).
Next, we will see the existing formalizations of fairness in
the machine learning literature. Table 1 summarizes how
they answer the questions presented above.
2.1. Fairness through unawareness
Any predictor which is not group-conditional satisfies this
measure. Formally, it is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (fairness through unawareness) A predictor is
said to achieve fairness through unawareness if protected
attributes are not explicitly used in the prediction process.
A number of proposed predictors in the machine learning
literature satisfy this measure (15; 29), while some don’t
(7; 21; 25). However, satisfying fairness through unaware-
ness is not a sufficient condition to avoid discrimination
when other background knowledge is available (33). Fur-
thermore, some of the assumptions made during the con-
struction of a predictor might not hold in real-life scenarios
(8) which leads to discrimination even while satisfying this
measure.
From the point of view of distributive justice, fairness
through unawareness corresponds to the approach of be-
ing “blind” to counter discrimination. However, various
discriminatory practices have been documented following
race-blind approach in education, housing, credit, criminal
justice system (6; 44). It has shown that, in the long run,
race-blind approach is less efficient than race-conscious ap-
proach (17). Alternatively, some studies show that a blind
approach can work for some specific tasks (20).
The above critiques challenge the suitability of fairness
through unawareness to domains in which, protected at-
tributes can be deduced from easily available non-protected
attributes and structural barriers, which hinder the pro-
tected groups, are shown to be present by credible surveys.
2.2. Counterfactual measures
These measures model fairness through tools from causal
interference. Kusner et al. (27) recently introduced one
such measure which can be defined as follows:
Definition 2 A predictor H is counterfactually fair, given
Z = z and A = a, for all y and a 6= a′, iff
P{HA=a = y | Z = z, A = a} = P{HA=a′ = y | Z =
z, A = a}
In the above definition, HA=a is to be interpreted as the
outcome of the predictorH if A had taken value a. For the
mathematical details of how such a statement is realized,
refer to Kusner et al. (27). This measure deems a predictor
to be fair if its output remains the same when the protected
attribute is flipped to its counterfactual value. This measure
compares every individual with a different version of them-
selves. A similar measure was introduced independently by
Kilbertus et al. (26).
In the literature of social sciences, the closest correspon-
dent to these measures is the theory for counterfactual rea-
soning given by Lewis (28). There has been research to in-
dicate that counterfactual reasoning is susceptible to hind-
sight bias (34; 38) and outcome bias (i.e. evaluating the
quality of a decision when its outcome is already known)
(4). Moreover, it has been argued that counterfactual rea-
soning may negatively influence the process of identifying
causality (39; 9).
These critiques bring into question the suitability of coun-
terfactual measures for potential domains for prediction us-
ing machine learning like health-care system or judicial sys-
tem where the above-mentioned biases are frequently ob-
served.
2.3. Group fairness (Statistical/demographic parity)
Group fairness imposes the condition that the predictor
should predict a particular outcome for individuals across
groups with almost equal probability.
Definition 3 (Group fairness) A predictor H : X → Y
achieves group fairness with bias ǫ with respect to groups
S, T ⊆ X and O ⊆ A being any subset of outcomes iff
|P{H(xi) ∈ O | xi ∈ S} − P{H(xj) ∈ O | xj ∈ T }| ≤ ǫ
From the above definition it is clear that, group fairness
imposes the condition of statistical and demographic parity
on the predictor. Unlike some of the other formalizations
of fairness, group fairness is independent of the “ground
truth” i.e. the label information. This is useful when reli-
able ground truth information is not available e.g. in do-
mains like employment, housing, credit and criminal jus-
tice, discrimination against protected groups has been well-
documented (31; 45). Alternatively, in the cases where
disproportionality in the respective outcomes can be justi-
fied by using non-protected attributes (which don’t merely
serve as a proxy for protected attributes), imposing statisti-
cal parity leads to incorrect outcomes and may amount to
discrimination against qualified candidates (29). Another
deficiency of group fairness is that the predictor is not stip-
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ulated to select the most “qualified” individuals within the
groups as long as it maintains statistical parity (15).
The formalization of group fairness follows from the no-
tion of collectivist egalitarianism for distributive justice. In
practice, the biggest (in terms of the number of people af-
fected) implementation of group fairness is the application
of affirmative action (11) in India and USA to address dis-
crimination on the basis of caste (14), race and gender. See
Weisskopf (46) for arguments made for and against affirma-
tive action polices in both India and the USA. Two of the
standard objections to group fairness are: it is not merito-
cratic and it reduces efficiency.
The underlying assumption behind the first claim is that
the allocation of social benefits without affirmative action is
meritocratic. However, several studies (12; 5; 32) have con-
firmed discrimination on the basis of protected attributes.
For the second claim, Holzer and Neumark (23) conclude
on the basis of several studies that “the empirical case
against Affirmative Action on the grounds of efficiency is
weak at best”. In India, a study by Deshpande and Weis-
skopf (13) found no evidence of loss in efficiency because
of affirmative action policies. Nonetheless, deficiencies
mentioned earlier limit the applicability of group fairness.
2.4. Individual fairness
Individual fairness ascertains that a predictor is fair if it
produces similar outputs for similar individuals.
Definition 4 (Individual fairness) A predictor achieves in-
dividual fairness iff H(xi) ≈ H(xj) | d(xi, xi) ≈ 0 where
d : X ×X → R is a distance metric for individuals.
Several works including Dwork et al. (15) and Luong et al.
(29) use this notion of fairness. The notion of individual
fairness can be then captured by (D, d)-Lipschitz property
which states that D(H(xi)Y ,H(xj)Y ) ≤ d(xi, xj) where
D is a distance measure for distributions. Furthermore,
Dwork et al. (15) prove that if a predictor satisfies (D, d)-
Lipschitz property, then it also achieves statistical parity
with certain bias.
In the social sciences literature, this formalization is equiv-
alent to individualism egalitarianism. According to Sack-
steder (40), this is the formal principle of justice. This no-
tion delegates the responsibility of ensuring fairness from
the predictor to the distance metric. If the distance metric
uses the protected attributes directly or indirectly to com-
pute the distance between two individuals, a predictor satis-
fying Definition 4 could still be discriminatory. Therefore,
the potency of this notion of fairness to prevent discrimina-
tion depends largely upon the distance metric used. Hence,
individual fairness as stated above, can not be considered
suitable for domains where reliable and non-discriminating
distance metric is not available 1.
2.5. Equality of opportunity
In the literature of machine learning, the formalization
of equality of opportunity was introduced by Hardt et al.
(21). An equivalent formalization was also proposed con-
currently and independently by Zafar et al. (48). To formal-
ize it, let us consider the case of binary outcomes with a
single beneficial outcome y = 1.
Definition 5 (Equal opportunity) A predictor is said to
satisfy equal opportunity with respect to group S iff
P{H(xi) = 1 | yi = 1, xi ∈ S} = P{H(xj) = 1 | yj =
1, xj ∈ X \ S}.
It can be considered as a stipulation which states that the
true positive rate should be the same for all the groups. An
equivalent notion proposed by Zafar et al. (48), called dis-
parate mistreatment, asks for the equivalence of misclassi-
fication rates across the groups.
In the social sciences literature, the corresponding notion
was presented by Rawls (37). An essay by Arneson (2)
states that equality of opportunitywould not be able to cope
with the problems of stunted ambition and selection by big-
otry. The notion of equality of opportunity has also been
criticized for not considering the effect of discrimination
due to protected attributes like gender (30) and race (43). It
has been shown that the protected attributes like race and
gender affect one’s access to opportunities in domains such
as education, business, politics in many parts of the world
(24). The exclusion of attributes like race and gender from
the list of attributes deemed to be affecting an individual’s
life prospects in the notion of equality of opportunity thus
calls into question its suitability to the domains in which
there exists vast evidence that such attributes do indeed af-
fect one’s prospects.
2.6. Preference-based fairness
Zafar et al. (47) introduce two preference-based formaliza-
tions of fairness. In order to provide the definitions for the
same, the authors first introduce the notion of group bene-
fit which is defined as the expected proportion of individ-
uals in the group for whom the predictor predicts the ben-
eficial outcome. Group benefit can also be defined as the
expected proportion of individuals from the group who re-
ceive the beneficial output for whom the true label is the
same. Based on the above notion of group benefit, Zafar
et al. (47) provide following two fairness formalizations.
Definition 6 (Preferred treatment) A group-conditional
predictor is said to satisfy preferred treatment if each group
of the population receives more benefit from their respec-
1 Dwork et al. (15) have provided some approaches to build
distance metrics.
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tive predictor then they would have received from any other
predictor i.e.
BS(HS) ≥ BS(HT ) for all S, T ⊂ X
Definition 7 (Preferred impact) A predictor H is said to
have preferred impact as compared to another predictorH′
ifH offers at-least as much benefit asH′ for all the groups.
BS(H) ≥ BS(H
′) for all S ⊂ X
If a classifier is not group-conditional then, it by default
satisfies preferred treatment. In certain applications, there
might not be a single universally accepted beneficial out-
come. It is possible that a few individuals from a group
may prefer another outcome than the one preferred by the
majority of the group. In order to alleviate their concerns,
the collectivist definition of group benefit needs to be ex-
tended to account for individual preferences.
In the social sciences literature, the above notion corre-
sponds to envy-freeness (3). This notion of fairness is at-
tractive because it can be defined in terms of ordinal prefer-
ence relations of the utility values of the predictors. On the
other hand, Holcombe (22) show that freedom from envy is
neither necessary nor sufficient for fairness. For many real-
world problems, one needs to find fair and efficient solu-
tions amongst the groups. An efficient solution ensures the
greatest possible benefit to the groups. In decision making
problems, like the domain applications of prediction with
machine learning, it can be formally expressed by the no-
tion of Pareto-efficiency. However, deciding whether there
is a Pareto-efficient envy-free allocation is computationally
very hard even with simple additive preferences (10).
These critiques indicate that the suitability of such envy-
free formalizations is limited only to the domains where
such an effective and envy-free allocation can be computed
easily.
3. Prospective notions of fairness
In this section, we describe two prospective notions of fair-
ness which have not been considered in the literature of ma-
chine learning so far. Our intent is to address the critique
that many of the past formalizations, as seen in Section 2,
do not offset for the fact that social benefits are being allo-
cated unequally by the algorithms among the people owing
to the attributes they had no say in.
• Equality of resources: Dworkin (16) propose the no-
tion of equality of resources in which unequal distri-
bution of social benefits is only considered fair when
it results from the intentional decisions and actions
of the concerned individuals. Equality of resources
is ambition-sensitive i.e. each individual’s ambitions
and choices that follow them ascertains the benefits
they receive and endowment-insensitive i.e. each indi-
vidual’s unchosen circumstances including the natural
endowments should be offset. In the second property,
equality of resources differs from equality of oppor-
tunity as the latter considers differences in natural en-
dowments (including the protected attributes such as
sex) as facts of nature which need not be adjusted to
achieve fairness.
• Equality of capability of functioning: Sen (42) ex-
tends the insight that people should not be held respon-
sible for attributes they had no say in to include per-
sonal attributes which cause difficulty in developing
functionings. Functionings are states of “being and
doing”, that is, various states of existence and activ-
ities that an individual can undertake. Sen (41; 42)
argue that variations related to the protected attributes
like age, sex, gender, race, caste give individuals un-
equal powers to achieve goals even when they have
the same opportunities. In order to equalize capabili-
ties, people should be compensated for their unequal
powers to convert opportunities into functionings. To
this point, it sounds similar to quality of resources de-
scribed above. Crucially however, the notion of equal-
ity of capability calls for addressing inequalities due
to social endowments (e.g. gender) as well as natural
endowments (e.g. sex) , in contrast to the equality of
resources (35).
One of the main strengths of this notion of fairness that
it is flexible which allows it to be developed and applied
in many different ways (1). Indeed, this notion has been
used in the foundations of human development paradigm
by the United Nations (18; 19). One of the major criti-
cism of Equality of capability theory concerns the failure
to identify of valuable capabilities (36). Another criticism
is that the informational requirement of this approach can
be very high (1). The second criticism applies to equality
of resources as well and it makes exact mathematical for-
malizations of these notions a potentially difficult problem.
However, the suitability of these prospective formalizations
(unlike the current formalizations) to domains in which nat-
ural endowments or social endowments or both impede an
individual’s prospect to receive social benefits makes the
open problem of formalizing them worthwhile. We intend
this article to serve as a call for machine learning experts to
work on formalizing them.
4. Discussion and further directions
As the field of fairness in machine learning prediction algo-
rithms is evolving rapidly, it is important for us to analyze
the fairness formalizations considered so far. To this end,
we juxtaposed the fairness notions previously considered
in the machine learning literature with their corresponding
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theories of distributive justice in the social sciences litera-
ture. We saw the theoretical critique and analysis of these
fairness notions from the social sciences literature. Such
critiques of the formalizations and experimental studies of
their use in large-scale practice serve as guiding principles
while choosing the fairness formalizations to use in partic-
ular domains.
We also proposed two prospective notions of fairness,
which have been studied extensively in the social sciences
literature. Of course, we do not claim that these notions
will serve as panacea for all the critiques of the current no-
tions. Our intention is to initiate a discussion about fair-
ness formalizations in prediction with machine learning
which recognize that - the problem of fair prediction can-
not be addressed without considering social issues such
as unequal access to resources and social conditioning.
While these factors are difficult to quantify and formal-
ize mathematically, it is important to acknowledge their
impact and attempt to incorporate them in fairness for-
malizations.
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